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In this paper we study the mathematical object matrix and compare its historical and psycholog-
ical origins.
The literature on history of mathematics tells that this science started with the study of numbers
and shapes, giving rise to the fields of arithmetic and geometry. The historical approach has been
leading to an interpretation of algebraic structures as secondary concepts, derived from systems of
equations representing numerical or geometrical constrains.
Our epistemological view supports the argument that matrices originate from a especial form of
tabulation, which had and still have a widespread use, appearing in different sciences and forms
of expression. Originally, these tables are not numerical and became matrices when numbers were
introduced in them. This view leads to the assumption that these algebraic structures are just as
fundamental as numbers and figures. Therefore we can assume that algebra is one of the most
fundamental domains of mathematics, forming a basic trilogy with the other two fields.
This review gives rise to new interpretations in the physical realm, where observational languages
are built a priori on suitable mathematical domains. It can show contrasting views between the
historical approach and the epistemological view. Observational realism is our guiding epistemology.
PACS numbers: 01.70, 02.10 De
I. INTRODUCTION.
Mathematics comprises the basic fields of number, geometry, algebra and their interre-
lations. The foundations of arithmetic and geometry had been, together or in separation,
extensively considered in literature. But the foundations of algebra are still obscure. It
is frequently considered as a sort of hybrid field, originating from the other two.
A reason for misunderstanding is in the somehow arbitrary usage of the word algebra
which has been adopted in very different senses. This name is used in the arithmetic
context, when a quantity is not explicitly shown in an equation. It is also used in the
geometrical domain, when classes of figures are expressed by means of constrains between
variables, this is the field of the algebraic geometry. The same holds for invariance in
the form of equations. Numerical analysis of geometry also produced formulas named
algorithms, which involve variables and for this reason are named algebraic forms. The
representation of series also adopts these formulas. And the study of vectors as geo-
metrical elements gave rise to the field of linear algebra. So, the name algebra became
associated to any kind of mathematical representation involving variables. And this arbi-
trariness does not help to make a sharp distinction between algebraic concepts, numbers
and geometrical elements, which will be shown here.
2In this work, we argue that the reason why algebra is a field of its own is because its
elements are matrices. In other words, matrix is the most fundamental concept of algebra.
And the historical view on the origin of these concepts adds to this mentioned obscurity,
by suggesting that algebraic structures, such as numerical matrices, originated in the
analysis of systems of equations. These systems are sets of independent equations but
connected by common variables in them. Literature on this topic localizes the appearance
of matrices in early Chinese texts from around 300 BC, dealing with these systems in the
context of financial and administrative applications of mathematics [1]. The historian C.
Boyer comments that a diagrammatic aspect, which he thought to be a characteristics of
matrices, had a natural appeal to the Chinese culture. Apparently, no questions about
the origins of these systems of equations emerged for those mathematicians, neither this
was discussed by the Greek philosophers, who were familiarized with them, in the same
practical context. The usage of matrices seems to have been so driven for practical
purposes that its intrinsic significance did not call any attention. Or, perhaps, texts on
these topics did not survive.
After nearly two thousand years, in the eighteenth century, strong interest on these
structures appeared in the context of systems of equations again. Soon later, analysis
and geometrical formulation of complex numbers, vectors and other concepts, forced a
reflection on the essences of both mathematics and logic, resulting in an intermingle
with them. Then, the old Aristotelian logic, originally applied to usual languages and
arithmetics, was reviewed and extended to treat relations between ‘abstract elements’. In
this way, mathematical concepts became elements of logic and mathematical operations
were identified with logic rules. Mathematical structures acquired a proper operational
field and the modern field of abstract logic emerged. Operational contexts started to be
discovered and organized in subfields named algebras or ‘sub-algebras’. The concept of
algebra of logic appeared in the nineteenth century, meaning the study of operational
domains and their interrelations. Slowly, as we can realize, there happened a logic shift,
which focused on the study of operations instead of focusing directly on the properties of
the operated elements [2, 3]. The rules got an objective status and started to define the
elements, not the other way around, which was the old starting point for logic and other
sciences [4, 5]. Why this shift happened, is an interesting question for epistemology and it
involves physics, mathematics and their relation. Mathematicians involved with this shift
were in close collaboration with physicists, if not both in one. A natural consequence of
this program was the elimination of innate ideas or any kind of a priori characterization
for the elements of the logic and also of science.
On one hand, a great portion of these developments happened around the concept
of matrix, but not only. The resurgence of matrices in the modern period did not
liberate them from systems of numbers, in spite of the strangeness of these beliefs. It
was accepted that matrices should not have a fundamental status, being logical elements
derived or defined by their operations. Otherwise, they could be built from operations,
involving other algebraic forms such as vectors or so. And matrices naturally entered the
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the formation of these structures. On the other hand, theoretical physics had plenty
of results which could not be understood and interpreted in connection with the usual
physical space. This involved, between others, situations which required representation
in complex spaces. This all revealed the existence of strange domains of interconnection
between physics and mathematics. Moreover, a shift in the realm of physics had also
emerged. Interactions, which before were relations, became objects in itself, in spite of
all the strangeness in them, such the absence of medium and other paradoxes connected
with the electromagnetic world.
The motivation behind the logic shift was probably to safeguard physics. The idea was
that, if mathematics could be liberated from ontological responsibilities, concerning these
non-real and structural elements, physics could be safe from metaphysics too. Nowadays,
there is a trend in the theoretical physical community to think that these structures could
even be primary in physics. But this is not in the sense of an observational primacy, as
we considered it here. The other interpretation is that physical reality derives from an
abstract mathematical realm.
In this paper, we study matrices. We follow arguments from the mathematician
Friedrich Frege (1848 − 1925), in his clarification of the conceptual nature of numbers,
[6, 7] to compare the origins of numbers and matrices. We find that there is some simi-
larity in these origins but they are very different mathematical objects. In our opinion,
this difference makes from arithmetics and algebra two separated sources of physical
expressions, which together with geometry can produce broader observational domains.
This work represents a step in the program of the observational realism, an epistemology
designed to tackle the evolution of the physical observer by focusing on the observational
languages and separating them inside the body of physical theories.
II. A FEW ELEMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE OF
NUMBERS.
The historical origin of numbers, arithmetics and geometry are known to be in the very
early days, when other languages emerged. Information from the very old past is not
acquired through written registers, but interpreted from pictures, diagrams and symbolic
organizations in burial and other archaeological means. Registers in tablets were done
later and more elaborated mathematical knowledge was already present around 5000 BC.
Around 3000 BC, Egyptians had a kind of arithmetics, although different from ours in
terms of representation of numbers. And around 2000 BC, civilizations in Mesopotamia
had devices for calculation, the abacus, and written registers of their knowledge. Sume-
rian, Akkadian and Babylonian peoples had developed geometry and numerical analysis.
Around the same time, in India, practical geometry was in use and the science being de-
veloped. Between 800 till 200 BC, they wrote religious texts, where they have shown to
4be well familiarized with simple equations, quadric and cubic equations originating from
geometry, rudiments of limits and ideas of infinity and eternity in connection with cosmo-
logical subjects. And around the same time, in central America, there were sophisticated
sciences of geometry, numbers, also applied to astronomy and construction.
There are Chinese documents, localized around 300 BC or much older, showing knowl-
edge on the subject of systems of equations. Methods for solution of these systems were
clearly presented in form of diagrams, later named matrices [1]. In Greece, the use of
logical methods were implicitly adopted much before Aristotle’s grounds of a science
of logic. Thales from Miletus (624 − 548BC) gave great contributions to mathematics,
especially to geometry. And Pythagoras of Samos (570 − 495BC) was the grounder of
a school in which numbers received great symbolic importance. The number one had a
special status, being generator of others. The idea that numbers could comprise a special
reality, emerged at that time. Socrates (469− 399BC) seems to have been the first who
discussed the possibility that we humans had an innate tendency to grasp the meanings
of certain ideas, considering numbers. This was told by Plato in his dialogs Meno and
Phaedo.
During these early periods, the concept of number was in development. Different ap-
proaches and applications of the original integers, generated new kinds of numbers. There
emerged the rational, irrationals, infinitesimal, reals, non-reals and several other sub-
classifications of these numbers, with specific properties. These discoveries were mostly
pushed by the science of measurements, practical geometry and its numerical analysis.
Since its emergence the science of the numbers obtained a very special status between
all the sciences. Numbers always had a certain power of truth in them.
It was with a certain astonishment, for himself and others, that Frege felt the need
of a clarification on these elements [6]. He started his inquiry by arguing that nobody,
even mathematicians, knew what a number was. In fact, starting to read his book The
Foundations of Arithmetic the reader enters in a world of bewildering astonishment, be-
fore to grasp the strength of his careful reasoning. Trying to understand a representation
of imaginary numbers introduced by C. F. Gauss (177− 1855), Frege disclosed an intel-
lectual vacuum, realizing that there was already a problem with the very familiar real
ones. The work of Frege is an exercise of reason, from the initial steps of the acquisition
of elemental ideas, to the process of selection, organization, reclassification and then the
reach of the complete chain of arguments, revealing all the hidden steps in the method of
numeration. And, even more surprising is the fact that he never acknowledged but de-
nied that he was observing his own natural intellectual process of formation of numbers.
He rejects the question of ‘who’ classifies classes to find out numbers. The argument
was that, if we all think the same, there is no subject to occupy the ‘who’: numbers are
themselves. This is the ‘high degree’ of objectivity in numbers, which is reclaimed by
present-day Neo Pythagoreans [8–10].
Frege’s definition of cardinal number received many criticism by other mathematicians
and philosophers [11]. There are different versions, but for the purpose of our study, the
5one called Frege-Russell definition, described by Bertrand Russell (1872− 1970), can be
considered [12]. The definition describes a double classification: “The number of a class
is the class of all those classes that are similar to it” .
III. FORMATION OF MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS, THE NATURE OF
THIS PROCESS.
Frege’s denial of a subject of the mathematical thinking also contributed to the assump-
tion of a metamathematics, which approaches the formation of mathematical and other
concepts as a mathematical topic. The question if mathematics can describe thoughts or
if it is the other way around, is a polemic one. If one considers that logic and linguistic,
between others, are also sciences of thinking, we find that consciousness is able to think
itself in different ways and organize its own thoughts according to different rules, unless
one can show that these sciences are just one.
There are different lines of thinking on this subject. The Neo Pythagorean tendency
denies a mental nature for mathematical principles. In this view, both physical and
psychological existences would ultimately be in tune with these principles.
Cognitive sciences consider thinking as perception, with a physiological or physical
realization. The mathematical thinking would be a refined kind of perception, performed
by a special system. The existence of different levels of perception, not directly related
to sensation [13] would accommodate a meta cognition. The latter is a semi-autonomous
kind of process, resulting from the organization or auto-organization of the neural system.
The condition of autonomy is not fully clarified, it is sometimes said to be emergent,
resulting from a natural hierarchy or neural organization, between other suggestions.
In this view, a mathematics of thoughts is a metamathematics, which would describe
bio-physical computational systems according to its own auto-generated patterns.
Mathematical models of perception have been proposed [14–16]. And the study of
mathematics and physics learning has been an important topic of study in cognitive
sciences and neuro psychology [17, 18]. A mathematical treatment of psychological and
social phenomena have been proposed and developed [19, 20]. The concept of shared
cognition, especially for the case of shared memory, is present in the cognitive sciences
[21, 22]. And the concept of collective consciousness, as distributed and shared cognition,
can also be defined in this domain. But it involves learning and communication, not being
a condition of an innate substratum of ideas.
The idea that the physical world a priori is a reality to be discovered and known by an
organism, which is a subsystem of this same world, naturally separates and limits this
organism from an outside. This separation is in the basis of perception, in the view of
the cognitive sciences. And perception develops according to its limits, which are settled
by its own formation. Therefore the ‘idea that the physical world a priori is a reality to
be discovered’ is not exactly an idea but just a belief, or an illusion of this perceptual
6system. It is a fact that perception is also formed on common grounds and this could be
an argument for this tendency to adjust itself to a common knowledge, generating pro-
cesses such as meta cognition, metamathematics and rationality from perception. This
adjustment would be in the basis of our sciences, as a shared product. In this interpre-
tation, notions such as physical reality and illusion would still not be fully meaningful,
due to the inherent limitations of perception.
Another idea, which would contrast with the cognitive approach on consciousness,
would be to give to physical world an a priori fully significance. This is the view elabo-
rated by Gottfried W. Leibniz (1646-1716). He developed logic, mathematics and physics,
was a prominent defender of the existence of innate ideas and suggested the concept
of unconsciousness [23]. His position radically differs from the Pythagorean and Neo
Pythagorean idealism, for which the mathematical objectivity would be outside reason.
He would not be in tune with cognitive sciences either. In spite of considering perception
and thinking as processes, he considered principles of reason as a necessity. Leibniz also
revived the topic of systems of equations and methods of solution, leading to a resur-
gence on the study of matrices [1, 24]. Later, a new approach on matrices emerged when
physicists started to reveal and model interactions taking place beyond the experimental
access of our senses.
At the end of the nineteenth century, psychoanalysis by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)
was established as a theory of consciousness and there after analytical psychology by Carl
Gustav Jung (1875-1961) emerged. Both theories worked out the notions of psychic layer,
psychic content and psychological composition. Analytical psychology introduced the
concept of innate idea in psychology, the concept of function of consciousness and classes
of conscious phenomena, between them thinking, language, perception and sensation.
Jung extended the Freudian notion of unconsciousness leading to the concept of self and
opening to new interpretations of objective knowledge, including archetypal patterns
and innate ideas in the psychological realm [25]. Jung and collaborators had also been
interested on symbols, numbers, mathematical concepts and languages, their meanings
and psychic origins. Wolfgang Pauli (1900 - 1958) collaborated with Jung and gave
contributions to the integration between physics and analytical psychology [26, 27]. He
investigated the assumption of archetypal roots in physical theories.
Pauli’s work did not elaborate on the difference between observation and theory, in
the way that this topic was considered by Rudolf Carnap (1891 - 1970). Physical theo-
ries comprise more than observational concepts, they include empirical and theoretical
languages and laws [28]. The question of the relation between theory and reality in fact
only applies to observational sector of theories. The epistemology of the observational
realism, adopted in this paper, is based on a combination of Carnap’s and Jung’s ideas.
This epistemology has been adopted in interpretation of physical languages, especially
for the case of observational descriptions and laws [29–32].
The physical languages are based on suitable mathematics which also originate from
archetypal symbolism. Both sciences have a common origin in the same common self from
7which the collective forms of thinking emerge. According to analytical psychology, the
Pythagorean encounter with ideal existences would not be possible outside the psychic
domain. In this tradition of thinking, this collective or innate ground of ideas is in the
basis of all human expressions and nothing beyond it could be pointed out by principle.
The concept of collective unconsciousness, as emphasized by Jung, is a hypothesis to
be supported by its effects, to explain a possible psychic evolution in a collective or in
an individual sense. In the deepest level, this evolution would be for each and for all
humans and this is the collectivity which mostly characterizes our physical world.
From this view, Frege’s inquires on the formation of number could never go beyond the
basis of psychological processes involved with the formation of numbers. Reconstructing
the concept of number, the elements he used in it should be in the basis of all, not
beyond. In other words, classification only can be possible if there are elements to be
classified and not the other way around. In the domain of science we are always talking
about what is explicitly conscious. In this view, it is also natural to assume that there
are sciences more general than others, due to their different collective levels of approach.
Next, we will discuss an example of mathematical object which has origins in what
we consider an archetypal pattern. It seems to be present since ancestral times, while
concepts and a language connecting it with other elements only emerged much later.
This is the case of the matrix, derived from tableaux or tabulation, which is a psychic
device extensively used in intellectual activities inside and outside science.
IV. THE OBJECT OF OUR STUDY.
In the mathematical literature, the word table has been used in different senses [33, 34].
It can refer to simple associations of sets of measurements or quantities. This method was
extensively adopted before the advent of the calculus, or mathematics of the continuous,
generating graphics by inferences and extrapolation, inspiring the formulation of physical
laws and leading to the introduction of the mathematical concept of function. But this is
not the concept of table which we study here, connected with those mentioned diagrams
of systems of equation. Here we will focus on the formation of a pre-numerical element
and in its continuation. This is a tendency for tabulating which has been present since
the early past.
Frege’s number is an index of classification of classes, involving a reclassification which
expels any other class which does not fall in this identification. Our element misses this
reclassification by integrating class with condition. The nature of the latter opens space
for an intrinsic form of systematization between elements. The idea is this basic model
of association of two in one. Representation of this object, outside mathematics, can be
found in scientific and non-scientific expressions such as totemism, social organization,
chess game, genetics and others. And the continuation, which would compare with
the natural induction of numbers, is a natural kind of multiplication or tabulation, here
8generated by the property of ‘condition’. But the usual representation of the proliferation
of elements, in form of rectangular or squared arrays, is just a matter of convenience, it
does not carry in it the meaning of the concept, as we can see by the other examples
outside mathematics.
As an example of tabulation, just to compare with our mathematical example, we can
consider a construction connecting three different kinds of animals with three different
nationalities. This would correspond to three different classes associated to three different
conditions on them. Let us consider cows, horses and rabbits as classes, to table with
Dutch, Brazilian and Chinese as conditions. This would produce combined elements as
such: Dutch cows, Dutch horses and Dutch rabbits, in the first row; Brazilian cows, etc
in the second; and similar story in the third line.
 dc dh drbc bh br
cc ch cr
 (1)
Above we have all possible associations explicitely indicated. Considering the perceptual
aspect of the information, because of the relative size of the picture and the capacity
of the human vision to have a global view, this kind of arrangement could be of great
interest. However, if one gives values to each of these elements, the information of
the associations remains present in the rows and columns which were defined at the
beginning, but there is also an extra gain, given by a possible comparison of the values
which one had not before. The usefulness of this device would still be related to the
human capacity to distinguish separations but still the mathematization of the table was
of great importance as a means of storage of knowledge.
Now let us follow the steps in the formation of a matrix, according to the historical
view, to highlight this relational aspect we mentioned. We now consider a case of two
variables and two equations, to make it simpler. As example, let us consider these two
equations below:
a + b = n1 (2)
and
a− b = n2, (3)
where a and b, are variables and n1, n2 are known fixed numbers. The kind of relation
expressed in equations (2) and(3) can produce an infinite number of values for one and
consequently for the other variable in each equation separately. In principle, there is
nothing to indicate that there is a relation between these equations. This is because,
considering each equation in separation, these a′s and b′s, can have any value. If one a
9has one specific value, the other a can still have infinite values. If one of the a′s is fixed,
nothing says that the other is fixed too, on the contrary, all indicates that they are not
at all related, and the same for the b′s. In fact, one arithmetic statement is a very strict
and closed relation.
To the reader of these equations, the message is that there is one equation and then the
other, nothing else. Moreover, any possible order in the readings or thoughts, concerning
each equation as a whole, and the two, is completely irrelevant. This means that the fact
that there is one a in one equation and the same letter in the other equation, nothing
says about their possible sameness, unless one registers this fact. So, a number or a set
of equations does not make them a system. The latter asks a different condition, which
is still missing. For them being a system, there must be a reason, a purpose or condition
explicitely given, to relate the equations. This is clearly a very different situation, when
comparing with the arithmetics involving the pairs a and b. One does not actually intend
to indicate that the two equations are added or subtracted, or operated in any sense.
Which would be the sense of the equations, considering them as a row? If this was the
case, they could be just written in the same line, with indications to make clear what
should be done. This is not the case. If there should be a purpose in a relation between
equations, which purpose would this be?
So, again, history says that matrices were derived from systems of equations. But
then, which was the condition that produced systematization of equations in the first
place? This is not explained in the books of history. Is there some kind of hidden
message or previous agreement behind the two arithmetic statements, which says that
we should consider letters and variables as the one and the same thing? The answer is
negative, otherwise one could take any a or b from other equations written somewhere
else and consider them all the same. This would not have sense at all. Is their proximity
in the paper a signal to connect them? Also not, for similar reason as the previous
one. There seems to be that there is no other argument than to assume that this
we call systematization exists and is a kind of relation in itself, independent from the
arithmetic one. And what does this systematization mean? Is this tabulation a form of
systematization? We think that yes, this is the case. The tabulation, in this case, just
reflects the mentioned proliferation of elements, from an original double object. And this
guides the interpretation of this set of equations, from the beginning.
In other words, this table is the representation of duality-proliferation. We then ar-
rived to the conclusion that matrices did not result from systems of equations but are the
inherent systematization of the equations. When arithmetics appeared, tables were al-
ready in the world and were tables which caught the equations, not the other way around.
This kind of systematization could also have been explored and developed independently
of numbers, as an independent element of expression.
10
V. MATRICES AND OPERATIONS.
From the view that matrices derived from systems of equations, studies and classifica-
tions of their properties developed with the sole interest to solve the systems of variables.
This study had many practical purposes based on numerical calculation and analysis.
The interests were to know in which conditions the equations were independent or not,
to find methods to reduce the amount and time of calculations, and others which only
involved the internal structural properties of the matrices. This view did not lead to any
question or insight on the relational meaning of its layers and interests on a functional
position of matrices outside the closed realm of their equations.
The next step was the analysis of this field and the construction of its integration with
the other two, which after all were reformed as well. One was the vast field of numbers,
which had new sub fields to be organized under the new theory of sets. The other
comprised the geometries, combining the Euclidean with the new discovered ones. Due
to the necessity of an inter-adaptation between the fields, matrices got an operational
treatment specially designed for this purpose.
Addition and subtraction can be defined directly from the combination of equivalent
systems of equation on the same variables, via operations on their variables, not involv-
ing the original matrix structure in any sense. This would be given by operations on
elements inside the matrices. As an example we could have the addition of three matrices
[A]+[B]=[C], as below:
[A] + [B] = [A + B], (4)
or
(
a11 a12
a21 −a22
)
+
(
b11 −b12
−b21 b22
)
=
(
c11 c12
c21 c22
)
, (5)
where (
c11 c12
c21 c22
)
=
(
(a11 + b11) (a12 − b12)
(a21 − b21) (−a22 + b22)
)
, (6)
where the elements aij , bij and cij , for i, j = [1, ..n] are just positive numbers or quantities
to which the arithmetic operations hold.
The relevant operations, which form the new algebra, are the product of matrices and
their analysis in vectorial components. In this way, matrices were broken in suitable
pieces, to be reconstructed again. The concept of vectorial space, as many others in
mathematics, was designed to serve as mediator between mathematical fields [35, 36].
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Traditionally, this has been one of the main objectives of mathematical research [37].
And the latter had been passing through reformulation, due to pressures from the natural
sciences, a natural process of scientific interrelation.
For nxn matrices [A] , [B] and [D], the multiplication is defined as follows:
[A][B] = [D], (7)
where, similarly, we would have
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)(
b11 b12
b21 b22
)
=
(
d11 d12
d21 d22
)
, (8)
which in fact is a very different operation as it can be seen through the results: d11 d12 ..d21 d22 ..
. . ..
 =
 a11b11 + a12b21 + .. a11b12 + a12b22 + .. ..a21b11 + a22b21 + .. a21b12 + a22b22 + .. ..
. . ..
 . (9)
From this general operation, two particular cases can be defined. One is a product of
vectors, given by:
 a11a21.
.
( b11 b12 . . ) =
 a11b11 a11b12 ..a21b11 a21b12 ..
. . ..
 . (10)
The other is the so called scalar product, given by:
(
a11 a12 . .
) b11b21.
.
 = (n)1x1, (11)
where n in this case is a number or scalar element. Since number and matrix are different
concepts, we must stress that a number n and a 1x1 matrix (n)1x1 are not the same
concept unless this is indicated, as an extra requirement.
VI. FINAL COMMENTS.
Matrices express systematization. In the physical realm, local and non-local interfer-
ences and interactions have been considered as the only expressions of physical influence
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on matter. Physical systematization is considered as a result of these influences under
general rules of conservation only. But the matrix form of systematization can enter ob-
servational physics as an a priori kind of relation, not resulting from physical influence
or interaction. This is an argument which deserves a careful investigation in physics
interpretation, especially in the domain of the quantum physics.
VII. AKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank Isabela Pombo Geertsma and David Pombo Costa for
fruitful discussions and Vincent Scheepmaker for revision of the text. C. Pombo thanks
Carlos Frederico Palmeira for his devotion as a teacher of mathematics.
[1] C. B. Boyer ,A history of mathematics, John Wiley and Sons, Inc. (1968)
[2] Joseph M. Bochenski, History of Formal Logic, Forgotten Books (June 24, 2012)
[3] William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic Oxford University Press,
1985.
[4] Ettore Carrucio, Mathematics and logic in history and contemporary thought, Faber and
Faber ltd. 1964.
[5] Jean-Yves Beziau, From consequence operator to universal logic: a survey of general ab-
stract logic, Logica Universalis Towards a General Theory of Logic, edit. Jean-Yves Beziau,
Birkhauser Verlag AG (2005).
[6] G. Frege,The Foundations of Arithmetic, J. L. Austin (trans.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell
(1974).
[7] Paulo Alcoforado, Gottlob Frege, logica e filosofia da linguagem, Edusp -Editora da Univer-
sidade de So Paulo, 2009.
[8] I. Volovich Number Theory as the Ultimate Physical Theory, p-Adic Numbers, Ultrametric
Analysis and Applications, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 7787, Pleiades Publishing, Ltd., 2010.
[9] A.S. Trushechkin, I.V. Volovich, Functional classical mechanics and rational numbers, p-
Adic Numbers Ultrametric Anal. Appl. 1:361, 2009.
[10] B. Dragovich, A. Yu. Khrennikov, S. V. Kozyrev, I. V. Volovich p-Adic Mathematical
Physics, Anal.Appl.1:1-17,2009.
[11] Boudewijn de Bruin, Wittgenstein’s Objections Against the Frege-Russell Definition of Num-
ber, Proceedings of the International Wittgenstein Symposium 1999, 109-113 Kirchberg am
Wechsel, 1999.
[12] Bertrand Russel, Introduction to mathematical philosophy, HardPress Publishing, 2013.
[13] E. Mart, Metacognicin, desarrollo y aprendizaje; Dossier documental, Infancia y apren-
dizaje, Routledge, 1995
[14] Peter Gardenfors, Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought, MIT Press, 2004.
13
[15] Peter Gardenfors, The Geometry of Meaning: Semantics Based on Conceptual Spaces, MIT
Press, 2014.
[16] Andrei Yu. Khrennikov, Classical and quantum mental models and Freud’s theory of un-
conscious/conscious mind , Vaxjo University Press, 2002.
[17] E. S. Spelke, Core knowledge, American Psychologist, 55, 1233-1243, 2000.
[18] Stanislas Dehaene, Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our
Thoughts, Viking Press, (2014).
[19] Andrei Yu. Khrennikov,Information Dynamics in Cognitive, Psychological, Social, and
Anomalous Phenomena, (Fundamental Theories of Physics) Springer, 2004.
[20] Emmanuel Haven and Andrei Yu. Khrennikov, Quantum Social Science, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press; 1 edition, 2013.
[21] Celia B Harris, Amanda J Barnier, John Sutton and Paul G Keil, Couples as socially dis-
tributed cognitive systems: Remembering in everyday social and material contexts, Memory
Studies Vol. 7(3) 285 297, 2014.
[22] Amanda J. Barnier, John Sutton, Celia B. Harris, Robert A. Wilson, A Conceptual and Em-
pirical Framework for the Social Distribution of Cognition: The Case of Memory, Cognitive
Systems Research, 2008.
[23] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Page, New Essays on Human Understanding Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Abridged edition, 1982.
[24] G. W. Leibniz and J. M. Child The early mathematical manuscripts of Leibniz Rough Draft
Printing 2007.
[25] C. G. Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, Collected Works Vol.9 Part 1,
Princeton University Press, 2 edition (1981).
[26] Carl Gustav Jung and Wolfgang Ernst Pauli, The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche,
Ishi Press, 2012.
[27] C.A. Meier,Atom and archetype : the Pauli-Jung letters, 1932-1958, Routledge, 2001.
[28] R. Carnap, The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts, Minnesota studies in
philosophy of science, Vol. I University of Minnesota press, (1964).
[29] Claudia Pombo, A New Comment on Dysons Exposition of Feynmans Proof of Maxwell
Equations, AIP Conf. Proc. 1101, 363 (2009).
[30] C. Pombo,, Concepts of information and their relation to space and geometry , Advances
in Quantum Theory, AIP Conference Proceedings, Volume 1327, pp. 450-459 (2011).
[31] Claudia Pombo, it Reflections on the nature of the concepts of field in physics, AIP Con-
ference Proceedings, Volume 1508, Issue 1, p.443-458, 2012.
[32] Claudia Pombo, Differentiation with Stratification: A Principle of Theoretical Physics in
the Tradition of the Memory Art, Foundations of Physics, Volume 45, Issue 10, pp.1301-
1310, 2015.
[33] Domenico Bertoloni Meli The Role of Numerical Tables in Galileo and Mersenne, Perspec-
tives on Science Vol. 12, No. 2, Pages 164-190, 2004.
[34] Martin Campbell-Kelly, Mary Croarken, Raymond Flood, and Eleanor Robson The History
of Mathematical Tables, From Sumer to Spreadsheets, Oxford University Press, 2003.
[35] C. T. Tai, A historical study of vector analysis, Technical Report RL 915, The University
of Michigan, 1995
[36] K. M. Hoffman, R. KunzeLinear Algebra, Prentice Hall (1965)
[37] Elemer Rosinger, Project in Rich Composition of Systems, viXra:1506.0159 2015.
